Within the inventory era, urban shrinkage characterized by economic decline and space decay has been widely witnessed in China. The modes and trajectories of urban redevelopment have thus become areas of major concern for both policymakers and scholars. Taking the multi-actor participation nature of redevelopment, this paper stemming from the game-theoretical approach demonstrates in empirical terms on two major fronts. First, the redevelopment of industrial land without the transfer of land use right is shown to be deadlocked by the incapacitation of the original land-user and unlocked with the participation of the new developer. Second, the preference of the original land-user to maximize its interests by operating by itself rather than continue to cooperate with the new developer is observed in the post-redevelopment stage. Therein, the entrepreneurial local government acts only as a “mediator” between the two market entities and tends not to directly intervene in their cooperation. Thus that, it is the reasonable distribution of potential benefits or the pricing of different rights in the land property right bundle rather than their definition that matters more for land redevelopment. Because the delineation of land property rights has never been a problem in a mature land market, particularly for stock industrial land.